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This paper deals with attitudes, values and ideologies as 
potentials in influencing cultural change toward more 
environmentally and socially sustainable socio-political 
system. The main framework of the discussion is the degrowth 
paradigm and the results of analyses are based on the two 
modules of the International Social Survey Program (2017). 
The main indicator of the (social) degrowth potentiality is 
the ‘ degrowth scale’, consisting of dimensions related the end 
of economic growth and the need for social change. Those 
dimensions are (statistically) contextualised within respondents’ 
socio-demographic characteristics, and their other values and 
attitudes, and discussed within the degrowth paradigm.
Keywords: degrowth paradigm, cultural change, sustainable 
socio-political system, value systems, ideology, ISSP 
Ta članek obravnava odnos, vrednote in ideologije, ki lahko 
potencialno vplivajo na kulturne spremembe k bolj okoljsko 
in socialno trajnostnemu družbeno-političnemu sistemu. 
Glavni okvir razprave je paradigma odrasti, rezultati analiz 
pa temeljijo na dveh modulih mednarodnega programa 
socialnega raziskovanja (2017). Glavni kazalnik (družbene) 
naraščanja potenciala je “ lestvica odrasti”, povezana s koncem 
gospodarske rasti in s potrebami po družbenih spremembah. 
Dimenzije odrasti so v razpravi (statistično) kontekstual-
izirane in se odražajo v socialno-demografskih značilnostih 
anketirancev in drugih njihovih vrednot in stališč.
Ključne besede: paradigma odrasti, kulturne spremembe, 
trajnostni družbenopolitični sistem, vrednostni sistemi, 
ideologija, ISSP
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INTRODUCTION
This paper is a part of larger research project related to the development of the indicators 
that can describe current socio-bio-physical metabolisms of societies in order to offer a 
vision of a more sustainable future (Domazet 2019). This vision is theoretically nested 
within the degrowth paradigm. Degrowth is a relatively new term related to the scholar-
ship that critiques the ideology behind the dogma of economic growth. As described by 
Kallis et al., economic growth is “an integrated cultural, political, ecological and economic 
process manifested as an increase in the total market value of all goods and services (GDP)”, 
and degrowth, as its opposition is “a process of political and social transformation that 
reduces a societies throughput (the energy and resource flows in and out of an society) 
while improving the quality of life” (Kallis 2018: 292), because it decouples quality of life, 
especially at aggregate societal level, from flow of materials and energy. In our analysis the 
societies’ potentiality for degrowth, or degrowth potentiality, is described and therefore 
‘measured’ as an ability for development, achievement, or success that is partially used or 
not used at all, and related to the process of political and social transformation to reduce 
a societies’ throughput. Our view of the degrowth potentiality is based on the theoretical 
and empirical research related to both economic growth and degrowth in the context of 
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climate change, and its mitigation seen primarily through the lens of a radical restructur-
ing of social infrastructure for maintenance and distribution of energy transformation. 
It has been discussed and established that economic growth as a policy goal appeared 
in 1950s, and soon it became ‘a bipartisan narrative that now transcends ideological divi-
sions’, and also furthermore, in terms of the depth of its internalization, it ‘infiltrated eve-
ryday practices and became popular common sense’ (Kallis et al. 2018: 295). According to 
historical analyses of the phenomena and its development and influence, in both political 
West and East, growth was used as an instrument by the political elite, although not in 
the same context. While in the West, growth was used to diffuse demands of the workers 
movements, in the East to excuse the lack of democracy and the failure of more revolutionary 
ambitions (Dale 2012; Purdey 2010; Schmelzer 2016). The most important tool of growth 
ideology is the calculation known as GDP, and studies show that its introduction was used 
as a means and gained dominance in making of nation states, in socio-economic and mili-
tary conflicts, geopolitics and global uneven development (Waring 1999). Degrowth as a 
solution is defined by ecological economists as an equitable downscaling of throughput, 
with a concomitant securing of wellbeing. As Kallis et al. (2018: 298) propose, ‘in future 
degrowth society, the economic is no longer center of everything; democracy is direct; 
surplus is expended for reproduction and fun; income and wealth are distributed according 
to egalitarian principles; vital resources, infrastructures and spaces are shared in common; 
technology is convivial and serves social purposes; resource throughput is minimized; and 
working hours are reduced by cutting consumption, production and wasteful expenditures’. 
From the description of the degrowth society it is obvious that it starts from the assump-
tion that all societal changes are in its core cultural, and any society bases it potential for 
transformation in the possibilities of change of its dominant values.  
This paper deals with the research problem of potentiality of a socio-political system to 
become more degrowth oriented and therefore realistically sustainable in the context of the 
climate change break down. Main goals of this paper are to a) explore socio-demographic 
characteristics of citizens that are inclined to highly value aspects of the degrowth attitude, b) 
explore which other values are connected in a broader attitude system that can be described 
as a transformative ‘degrowth society’ ideology, and c) to discuss the findings within the 
theoretical paradigm of the degrowth. We perceive that our analyses can give a clue which 
values should be supported and strengthened in a society in order for the degrowth social 
transformations to have a chance to succeed. The analysis presented in the paper is based 
on the results of the International Social Survey Program modules carried out in Croatia 
in 2018, Networks and The Role of Government. Main indicator of the (social) degrowth 
potentiality is the ‘degrowth scale’, constructed by the authors of this paper and added in 
the standard ISSP survey. 
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A CULTURAL CHANGE FOR THE BETTER (OR ONLY POSSIBLE) FUTURE
There are recognized cultural, underlying problems of the Anthropocene, the geological 
epoch in which humans have in a brief time become a main geophysical force on the Earth 
(Steffen et al. 2007). Latour (1993) relates the problem of modernity to its constitution of 
reality through a strong separation between nature and culture, and critical theorists add to 
it the problem of all of the progress being powered by the fossil fuels and the expectations 
of capitalist production (Moore 2015; Malm 2016). Fossil fuel capitalism as a consequence 
of efforts by competitive capitalist production to lower the cost of input: primarily labour 
even at trade-off with energy in some cases, while accumulating profit, brought us domi-
nance of economic values, especially of the growth paradigm, the exploitation of humans 
and alienation together with the modern illnesses. Today we face unprecedented environ-
mental degradation, scarcity of essential materials, catastrophic loss of biological diversity 
and evolutionary pressures to the Earth’s animal and plant species, global warming and 
climate change. Those are a direct result of the capitalist industrialisation and technologi-
cal innovation as an instrument and utility of mass production and consumption, which 
resulted in ruthless exploitation of natural resources and huge amounts of carbon dioxide 
emissions, by-products such as fly ash, chemicals and microplastics. 
However, concepts like Anthropocene and Climate change artificially universalise 
both the future and the past of humanity, dealing with the Earth as a whole world (Jasanoff 
2015). In reality of the humans and non-humans occupying the Earth, the past is the one of 
colonisation, exploitation, subjugation and injustice. Present is localised in terms of exploi-
tation and environmental degradation, of inequality and poverty, path dependent on the 
past and dependent on the future of environmental pollution, scarcity of natural resources, 
and climate change (sometimes combined). In such context, degrowth imaginary focuses 
its effort on localised principles that can be universally applied with localised adjustments. 
Those are an end of exploitation, direct democracy, localised production, reclaiming and 
sharing of the commons, unproductive expenditures (collective festives), diversification of 
economy, decommodification of labour and land (Kallis 2018). 
Dominance of economic values in society supported/instantiated by Capitalism has 
influenced the personal life and life of families tremendously. Already at the beginning of the 
20th century in Women’s Suffrage and Class Struggle (1912), Rosa Luxemburg has observed that
[t]his kind of work (bringing up children and housework) is not productive in the 
sense of the present capitalist economy… no matter how enormous an achieve-
ment, the sacrifices and energy spent, the thousand little efforts add up to. This 
is but a private affair of the worker, his happiness and blessing, and therefore 
non-existent for our present society. As long as capitalism and the wage system 
rule, only that kind of work is considered as productive, which produces surplus 
value, which creates capitalist profit. (Hudis and Anderson 2004: 241). 
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Today, the question of care, self-care, care for children, elderly and households, for 
the vulnerable members of society, is one of the central points in the degrowth paradigm 
thinking. As D’Alisa and Cattaneo (2013) argue, revaluation and redistribution of care work 
is vital for an equitable degrowth transition. Therefore the central points of the degrowth 
transition we focus on in our paper are related to norms and values in domains of economy, 
class, democracy, gender equality, relationships and care, including care for the environment. 
PARADIGMS, IDEOLOGIES AND ATTITUDES, VALUES AND BEHAVIOR
In terms of understanding of what we are trying to discern from a certain kinds of social 
science data, collected in a certain manner, it is necessary to explain concepts used, that 
is: ideology, attitudes and values, and also what is the nature of connection of all of those. 
According to Karl Mannheim implicit to the word ideology is “... the insight that in 
certain situations the collective unconscious of certain groups obscures the real conditions 
of society both to itself and to others and thereby stabilizes it. For Mannheim, this revela-
tion arises from political conflict, in which “ruling groups in their thinking can become so 
interest-bound to a situation that they are simply no longer able to see certain facts which 
would undermine their sense of domination” (1949: 36). For Gramsci (2007) ideology is 
at once the obscure realm of common sense and the transparent sphere of individual and 
collective consciousness, and our historical and practical task is to make consciousness 
transparent. Ideology can become self-transparent through struggles, political positioning, 
and the establishment of collective goals. 
However, we need a methodologically operational outlook on ideology in order to explore 
the possibilities of the concept and its uses. Because we use quantitative methodology and 
survey as a method, the easiest and most reliable approach to the measurement and explana-
tions of the ideology concept is through much-used Eysenck’s theory of the four levels of 
attitudes, an insight that he has acquired by performing factor analyses of political attitudes 
(Eysenck 1954). At the bottom there are specific opinions, “which are not in any way related 
to other opinions, which are not in any way characteristic of a person who makes them, and 
which are not reproducible” (Eysenck 1954: 111). Those are for example news media sites 
specific polls, related to everyday news. Habitual opinions are second level attitudes, those 
are reproducible and are more persistent on individual features, and are expressed through 
different specific opinions (e.g. attitudinal, Likert-scale measured statements in opinion 
polls). Attitude is built out of a number of related habitual opinions. Eysenck here gives an 
example of an anti-Semitic attitude, which consists of and is expressed through number of 
negative opinions on Jews. Attitudes are often not independent of other domains related 
attitudes, and together they form ideologies (Eysenck 1954: 112–113). For example, ethno-
centrism, patriotism, pro-religious attitudes, strict bringing up of children etc. are often 
strongly positively correlated, and together form components of conservative ideology. We 
find Eysneck’s methodological approach useful in trying to discern the degrowth ideology.
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CROATIA AS ‘A CASE’ 
This study, in its methodological organisation and ontological foundations, is not a case 
study. However in this particular paper, we use Croatia as a case. Thinking and writing 
about post-socialist Ex-Yugoslav countries, unavoidably guides us to the concepts of semi-
periphery and post-socialist structure of societies (Domazet and Marinović Jerolimov 
2014). Semi-periphery is a term for countries which mix both core and peripheral forms of 
organisation, transmit flows between core and peripheral regions, and exhibit cultural and 
social institutions’ features intermediate in form between surrounding core and peripheral 
areas (Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997; Wallerstein 1998). Croatia is an interesting example 
of friction, co-production of different messy realities because universal claims related to 
capitalism and progressive norms and values are introduced and are in friction with the 
post-socialist environment, social institutions in transition, Roman-Catholicism as pre-
dominant religion, conservative but also progressive values and norms (see, e.g., Ringdal 
and Simkus 2012; Črpić and Zrinščak 2016). This friction with a complex environment 
and many opposing actors produces messy outcomes, as it does in such environments (Tsing 
2005). Actors involved are not just social institutions but also natural resources and climate. 
METHODS
Analyses presented in the paper are performed on the data from the International Social 
Survey Project modules Role of Government and Networks, which was conducted in Croatia 
in 2017. Sample of 1026 respondents is representative for the Croatian population in 
terms of age, sex and education. Degrowth scale battery, consisting of variables in forms 
of statements measured on the Likert scale, was constructed out of the questions used 
internationally in different surveys and was added to the internationally standardised 
modules questionnaire.
INSTRUMENTS
Socio-demographics (Independents): Age in years of respondents at the time of conduct-
ing of research. Education was measured as a total number of years of formal education. 
Personal income refers to self-reported monthly personal income average of respondent. 
Urban-rural place of residence was assessed by the following categorical variable: 1– “a big 
city”, 2 – “a suburb or a outskirt of a big city”, 3 – “a town or a small city”, 4 – “a village”. 
Political left – right preference is recoded from the variable that collected answers on the party 
respondents voted for on the last parliamentary elections in Croatia (in 2016). Parties were 
recorded in 1 – left, 2 – centre and 3 – right. Religiosity is measured through the question 
related to church attendance, from – 1 several times a week or more often, to 8 – never.
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Dependents: Government spending is assessed with the questions if government should 
spend a money on environment; health; police and law enforcement; military and defence; 
old age pensions; unemployment benefits; culture and arts; and results are measured on 
a scale from 1 – “spend much less” to 5 – “spend much more”. Government responsibility 
is assessed with the questions if government should be responsible for providing job for 
everyone; control prices; provide health care for sick; provide living standard for the old; 
help industry grow; provide living standard for unemployed; reduce income differences 
rich/poor; financial help to students; provide decent housing; laws to protect environment; 
promote equality between men/women. Results are measured on a scale from 1 – “definitely 
should not be responsible” to 4 – “definitely should be responsible”. Interest in politics is assessed 
with the question on how interested is the respondent in politics on the scale from 1 – “not 
interested at all” through 5 – “very interested”. Citizens’ power over government is assessed with 
the opinion “People like me have no say in what government does” and with a scale from 
1 – “strongly agree” to 5 – “strongly disagree”. Understanding of politics relates to the answer to 
opinion “I have a good understanding of political issues” choosing from 1 – strongly disagree 
to 5 – strongly agree. Redistribution is measured on four variables – opinions, “Differences 
in income are too large”, “Differences in people’s standard of living should be small in fair 
societies”, “It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income 
between people with high and low incomes”, “Social benefits make people lazy”. Results 
were measured on the Likert scale from 1 – “strongly disagree” through 5 – “strongly agree”. 
Care is measured on three variables – opinions, “Adult children have a duty to look after 
their elderly parents”, “Take care of yourself and family comes first, before helping others” 
and “People better off should help friends who are less well of”. Results were measured on 
the Likert scale from 1 – “strongly disagree” through 5 – “strongly agree”.
Degrowth scale(s): There are nine items that are included in the questionnaire and that 
are used in our analysis that represent the degrowth attitudes, as constructed by the authors 
of this study and based on previous research surveys (Drews and Van den Bergh 2016, EVS 
2015). The items that measure degrowth in the factor analysis, varimax rotation, are loaded 
on three components, therefore we recognize that the degrowth scale consists of obvious 
three dimensions. The three dimensions are highly positively correlated (degrowth 1 and 
degrowth 2, r=.303, p>0.001, degrowth 2 and degrowth 3 r= .220, p>0.001, degrowth 1 
and degrowth 3 r=.195, p>0.001). Those are:  
Factor degrowth 1 consisting of the following items: 1. Climate change and other 
environmental problems will sooner or later result in an end to economic growth; 2. Limited 
availability of natural resources (e.g. oil, gas) will sooner or later result in an end to economic 
growth; 3. Economic growth always harms the environment; 4. To contribute to the fair 
mitigation of global climate change Croatia must reduce its CO2 emissions. Answers are 
measured on a Likert scale ranging from 1 – “completely disagree” through 5 – “completely 
agree”. These items are highly saturated on the single factor (48% of variance explained, .69 
average factor loading). Cronbach alpha in the procedure for the additive scale constructed 
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for the items is .63.  A higher result on the scale signifies being more inclined to end eco-
nomic growth for the purpose of preserving or mitigating the environment, therefore we 
have named the scale “Degrowth – the end of growth”.
Factor degrowth 2 consisting of the following items: 1. Current global economic system 
is unsustainable; 2. In order to have just and sustainable economy a deep societal change 
is required; 3. To reduce poverty we need to redistribute money and material possession. 
Answers are measured on a Likert scale ranging from 1 – “completely disagree” through 5 
– “completely agree”. These items are highly saturated on the single factor (49% of variance 
explained, .70 average factor loading). Cronbach alpha in the procedure for the additive 
scale constructed for the items is .48.  A higher result on the scale signifies being more in 
favour of social and economic change and we have named the scale “Degrowth – the need 
for social and economic change”.
Factor degrowth 3 consisting of the following items: 1. We need to put less emphasis 
on money and material possessions; 2. People should spend less time in paid work and more 
in voluntary community activities/engagement. Answers are measured on a Likert scale 
ranging from 1 – “completely disagree” through 5 – “completely agree”. These variables are 
highly saturated on the single factor (61% of variance explained, .77 average factor loading). 
Cronbach alpha in the procedure for the additive composite constructed for the items is 
.36. A higher result on the composite signifies being more inclined to abolish materialist 
values and we have named the composite “Degrowth – a non-materialist turn”.
Of additive scales that represent the degrowth as an empirical concept in our research, 
‘the end of growth’ is the strongest, and ‘a non-materialist turn’ weakest dimension in terms 
of its statistical power. Of all of the instruments from the ISSP Croatia Role of government 
and Networks dataset used in our analyses, only the degrowth scale was partially used in 
the analyses presented in the paper Domazet (2019).
RESULTS
First, we were interested in the distribution of the respondents concerning dimensions and 
computed scales, especially for those who agree and agree strongly with all of the statements. 
There are 285 respondents (27.8%) who agree (4) and/or agree completely (5) with the 
statements related to the end of growth scale. The statements of the scale of a need for social 
and economic change are supported with (completely) agree answers by 635 respondents 
(61.8% of the sample), and there are 251 (24,5%) respondents who have answered that they 
agree or completely agree with the statements of the composite called a non-materialist turn. 
There are 88 respondents strongly supporting (answering 4 agree and 5 completely agree) 
all variables of the degrowth scale. Combined the end of growth and a need for social and 
economic change are supported with (completely) agree answers by 229 respondents. The 
end of growth and a non-materialist turn are supported in combination by 105 respondents, 
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and a need for social and economic change and a non-materialist turn by 191 respondents. 
Out of the numbers, it is obvious that a need for social and economic change is the most sup-
ported dimension of the researched degrowth concept. However, in our analyses we were 
interested in possible other attitudes that are supported by all (degrowth) respondents no 
matter the dimension(s) of the degrowth they are supporting the most.  
ANALYSIS RELATED TO SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
We briefly describe the demographics of the respondents, divided by the three scales, in 
order to learn something more about our “target” population. First, we present results for 
the scale, and then discuss a bit about the respondents who are an ‘extreme’ on this dimen-
sion in the sense that they agree, or completely agree with all of the related statements. 
We have tested for significant differences/correlations for degrowth scales 1, 2 and 
3, related to sex, age, and education of respondent, personal income, urban-rural type of 
setlement, political preference and religiosity (church attendance). Related to “the end of 
growth” scale, there is significant effect for age, education and sex of respondent, showing 
that this type of thinking is more supported by older respondents (r=.107, p=0.001), by 
less educated (-.130, p=0.000) and more by female respondents (t (960)=3.05, p=0.002). 
Also by respondents with lower personal income (r=-.134, p=0.000). Frequency of church 
attendance and the size of settlement where respondents live has no significant effect on 
their attitudes, left-right party preference has no significant effect. Regarding the scale of 
“a need for social and economic change” significant effects are found for age and education of 
respondents. Older respondents, and more educated, are supporting this view more (r=174, 
p= 0.000; r=076, p=0.017), and those who have lower personal income (r=-.087, p=0.006). 
There is also a significant, albeit quite weak effect related party preference in a way that left 
voters are supporting this attitude more (score higher on a scale) (r=-.090, p=0.032). There 
are no significant effects for other tested independents. Somewhat different outcome is for 
the scale “a non-materialist turn”, for which significant effects are for the type of place of 
residence, those from more urban settlements support this view significantly more often 
(F(3)=3.64, p=0.012). 
As mentioned before, there are 88 respondents who agreed and strongly agreed with 
all of the statements on the degrowth scale, on all three dimensions. Those are slightly 
more female (51%) compared to male respondents, their average age is 50 years old, mostly 
they have completed high school, and they often live in a more rural settlements (52%). 
In our analyses presented in this paper we were interested in possible other attitudes 
that are supported by all (degrowth) respondents no matter the dimension(s) of the degrowth 
they are supporting the most. 
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OPINIONS RELATED TO THE DEGROWTH IDEOLOGY
First we discuss respondents opinions related to the government-spending (table 1) and 
responsibility (table 2). We have built six linear regression models, two for each scale as 
criteria, and with including of the usual suspects – age, sex, education, place of residence 
and income as the standard socio-demographic block. Those models are weak in terms of 
their statistical power, but are offering us an outlook on the most important topics related 
to our dimensions/attitudes of the degrowth ideology (measured on scales) in the domains 
of governments’ spending and responsibility.
As can be seen from the table 1, significant correlates of the end of growth scale/attitude 
are the opinion that government should spend money on environment. For the scale a need 
for social and economic change, significant is health, old age pensions, and education, and those 
supporting the scale are significantly opposing spending on military and defence. Those 
are significantly older respondents, which possibly explains selection of old age pensions 
in top priorities. For those supporting the composite a non-materialist turn, government 
should also spend money on environment, but also culture and arts. 
Table 1. Correlates of attitudes toward the degrowth dimensions: government spending
The end of growth A need for social and economic change
A non-materialist 
turn
Betta coefficients/(p<) Betta coefficients/(p<) Betta coefficients/(p<)
Age -0,039 ,128 (p< .00) -0,039
Sex (2 Female) ,065 (p< .05) 0,044 -0,017
Education (0 No school -7 Phd) -,099 (p< .01) ,085 (p< .01) 0,041
Urban-rural place of residence -0,008 -0,048 -,073 (p< .05)
Income (monthly averge in 
kuna) -,096 (p< .05) -,028 -0,022
Government should spend 
money: environment ,134 (p< .00) 0,047 ,097 (p< .01)
Government should spend 
money: health 0,054 ,149 (p< .00) 0,024
Government should spend 
money: police and law 
enforcement
0,02 -0,036 0,031
Government should spend 
money: education 0,014 ,080 (p< .05) 0,001
Government should spend 
money: military and defence 0,009 -,097 (p< .01) -,022
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Government should spend 
money: old age pensions 0,052 ,158 (p< .00) -0,024




Government should spend 
money: culture and arts 0,057 0,053 ,104 (p< .01)
F-ratio 6,544 13,075 3,431
F-sig. .000 .000 .000
R² 0,089 0,15 0,035
Adjusted  R² 0,077 0,14 0,024
Regarding the question on what should the government be responsible for, for all three 
scales there is (significant) expressed opinion that it should be for environmental laws and 
for the provision of decent housing for everyone. In addition, together with the support for 
the end of growth attitude and a need for social and economic change attitude, grows the 
support for the government responsibility for the reduction of the income differences for all.
Table 2. Correlates of attitudes toward the degrowth dimensions: government responsibility
The end of growth A need for social and economic change
A non-materialist 
turn
Betta coefficients/(p<) Betta coefficients/(p<) Betta coefficients/(p<)
Age 0,052 0,138 -0,033
Sex (2 Female) ,078 (p< .05) 0,041 -0,014
Education (0 No school -7 Phd) -,072 (p< .05) ,114 0,05
Urban-rural place of residence -0,019 -0,045 -,075 (p< .05)
Income (monthly averge in 
kuna) -,082 (p< .05) -,058 0,006
Government responsibility: 
provide job for everyone ,083 (p< .05) 0,049 0,035
Government responsibility: 
control prices ,106 (p< .01) -0,059 -0,042
Government responsibility: 
provide health care for sick 0,011 0,012 -0,017
Government responsibility: 




help industry grow 0,056 0,074 0,007
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Government responsibility: 




reduce income differences 
rich/ poor
,086 (p< .05) ,182 (p< .05) 0,116
Government responsibility: 
financial help to students -0,055 0,023 -0,032
Government responsibility: 
provide decent housing ,105 (p< .01) ,132 (p< .01) -,033 (p< .01)
Government responsibility: 
laws to protect environment ,081 (p< .05) ,011 (p< .05) -,014 (p< .05)
Government responsibility: 
promote equality between 
men/ women
-0,061 0,016 0,05
F-ratio 7,753 12,095 4,095
F-sig. .000 .000 .000
R² 0,124 0,17 0,054
Adjusted  R² 0,109 0,156 0,038
Second, we discuss opinions on social and economic redistribution (table 3). Again, 
models are not strong in terms of their statistical power, but are still the source of impor-
tant insights. With the growth of results on all of the three degrowth scales - composites/
attitude dimensions, grows the support for the thinking that differences in peoples standard 
of living should be small in fair societies, and that the responsibility of government is to 
reduce differences in incomes. In addition with the support for the end of growth scale, 
grows the inclination for respondents to believe that social benefits make people lazy. In 
addition, with the support for a need for social and economic change scale grows the support 
for the opinion that differences in income are too large.
Table 3. Correlates of attitudes toward the degrowth dimensions: social and economic redistribution
The end of growth A need for social and economic change
A non-materialist 
turn
Betta coefficients/(p<) Betta coefficients/(p<) Betta coefficients/(p<)
Age 0,035 ,087 (p< .01) -0,047
Sex (2 Female) ,087 (p< .01) 0,053 -0,005
Education (0 No school -7 Phd) -,083 (p< .05) ,121 (p< .00) 0,053
Urban-rural settlement -0,029 -0,049 -,072 (p< .05)
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Income (monthly averge in 
kuna) -,073 (p< .05) -,035 -0,002
Differences in income are too 
large 0,056 ,185 (p< .00) -0,032
Differences in people’s stand-
ard of living should be small 
in fair societies
,128 (p< .01) ,149 (p< .00) ,131 (p< .01)
It is the responsibility of the 
government to reduce the 
differences in income between 
people with high and low 
incomes
,115 (p< .01) ,202 (p< .00) ,087 (p> .05)
Social benefits make people 
lazy ,112 (p< .00) 0,087 -0,055
F-ratio 20,962 59,655 8,122
F-sig. .000 .000 .000
R² 0,121 0,235 0,042
Adjusted  R² 0,113 0,228 0,033
Following analyses, six models, are related to opinions on politics and on practices of 
care for others. In the first three models (table 4) we can see that for all three scales inter-
est in politics is not significant. The results of the end of growth scale rise together with the 
results of the opinion that respondent him/herself has no say about what the government 
does. It is similar for the scale a need for social and economic change, while for the third 
composite the result is, interestingly, opposite. The first scale also has significant effect for 
the perceived (not) good understanding of political issues. 
Table 4. Correlates of attitudes toward the degrowth dimensions: interest in politics and perceived 
democratic potential
The end of growth A need for social and economic change
A non-materialist 
turn
Betta coefficients/(p<) Betta coefficients/(p<) Betta coefficients/(p<)
Age ,093 (p< .01) ,137 (p< .00) -0,032
Sex (2 Female) 0,079 ,066 (p< .05) 0,007
Education (0 No school -7 Phd) -,110 (p< .01) ,079 (p< .05) 0,043
Urban-rural place of residence -0,016 -0,034 -0,079
Income (monthly average in 
kuna) -,089 (p< .01) -,079 (p< .05) -,021
How much interested in politics 0 -0,004 0,027
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People like me have no say 
about what government does ,074 (p< .01) ,158 (p< .00) -,090 (p< .01)
Good understanding of politi-
cal issues -,084 (p< .05) ,067 0,007
F-ratio 3,952 7,172 2,522
F-sig. .000 .000 .000
R² 0,057 0,76 0,2
Adjusted  R² 0,49 0,68 0,12
The last three models are related to the care for others (table 5), and we find that 
the opinion that people better off should help their friends is highly positively correlated 
with all three scales/attitudes. In addition, for the composite a non materialist turn there 
is significant negative correlation for the opinion that one should take care of him/herself 
and family first, before helping others, meaning that those agreeing with the opinions on 
a non-materialist turn composite support such view less often.
Table 5. Correlates of attitudes toward the degrowth dimensions: Care for others
The end of growth A need for social and economic change
A non-materialist 
turn
Betta coefficients/(p<) Betta coefficients/(p<) Betta coefficients/(p<)
Age 0,061 ,150 (p< .000) -0,031
Sex (2 Female) ,101 (p< .010) ,072 (p< .050) 0,005
Education (0 No school -7 Phd) -,097 (p< .010) ,105 (p< .010) 0,046
Urban-rural settlement -0,009 -0,048 -,072 (p< .050)
Income (monthly averge in 
kuna) -0,086 -0,054 -0,011
Adult childern have a duty to 
look after their elderly parents 0,02 0,063 -0,004
Take care of yourself and 
family first, before helping 
others
0,021 0,047 -,076 (p< .050)
People better off should help 
friends who are less well of ,167 (p< .000) ,125 (p< .000) ,171 (p< .000)
F-ratio 10,685 9,976 10,675
F-sig. .000 .000 .000
R² .076 .077 .041
Adjusted  R² .068 .069 .034
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INSIGHTS AND CONCLUSION
Let us briefly see what we have achieved in Eysenck’s (1954) terms. We have started with 
data on the habitual opinions of respondents of what we have called (based on previous 
theoretical and research work of many authors) the degrowth construct. Factor analysis 
extracted three dimensions/attitudes, those attitudes are related to recognition of the need 
for the end of economic growth, recognition of the need of society to make a social change, 
and last, recognition that society has to become less materialistically oriented. All those 
attitudes are highly correlated with each other. Next we have found habitual opinions that 
are also significantly correlated to the degrowth attitudes, that we assume are also a part 
of attitudes related to the degrowth ideology (D’Alisa et al. 2014; Kallis 2018). Those are 
from the domain of attitudes on economics (1), social justice and inequality (4), the role 
of government (6), democracy (1), social care (3) and environmental care (2). We have also 
found that a number of habitual opinions are not significantly correlated to our degrowth 
attitudes, and we find those to be important additions in understanding of what the degrowth 
ideology is, primarily in Croatian society, and second in its aspects in other societies as well. 
We find that our findings support a theoretical notion that the degrowth ideology is the 
one that requests economic redistribution together with the provision of decent living for 
all of the members of society. In addition, in aspects it is an ideology of care for friends, and 
certainly for the environment. It values non-material aspects of everyday life, such as arts 
and culture. There is no clear ideological orientation in terms on left or right on the political 
spectrum, at least does not appear so in Croatia, although there is slight trend of leaning 
toward left parties, but this should be further explored. There is also a lack of confidence, 
at least in some measure, in one’s own political power and knowledge of politics, and no 
significant interest in politics is expressed. Whether this signifies disbelief in representative 
democracy and politics per se, or just disappointment with Croatian everyday politics is 
an issue that should be explored in future research. 
As results have shown, older generations support attitudes/dimensions of the degrowth 
ideology more than the younger. However, the Croatian nation is growing significantly older, 
just as the other nations in the developed world that is most enjoined to alter material and 
energy flows, therefore reflection and expressed support for change in the older generation 
could be more of an asset than a problem. In addition, because of the dispersion of results 
related to education, and sex of respondents, their personal income and place of residence, we 
perceive that there is almost equal potential for development of aspects of the degrowth attitudes 
within the whole population. That is, we perceive that this degrowth attitude inclination is 
more related to the other experiences and opinions of citizens, and less to their demographics.
As we perceive the three dimensions to be a part of the higher-level construct - the 
degrowth ideology, we find that other attitudes found to be significant in our analyses are 
also a part of the degrowth ideology, that is: support the degrowth orientation. We base 
this understanding on the fact that those attitudes are equally or mostly supported by the 
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respondents no matter the dimension of the degrowth scale they support the most. Those are 
first of all support for the income redistribution, for government spending on environment, 
and responsibility of government for the environmental laws. Also significant support for 
the government responsibility in reduction of income differences between rich and poor, 
and provision of decent housing for all. Significantly more supported by the respondents 
is also the opinion that one should help one’s friends if one is better off, however they do 
not significantly differ in an attitude on the necessity of helping one’s elderly parents, but 
also there’s no significant effect related to whether one should help one’s family above all 
other people. Significant disbelief in democracy is expressed, in terms of the lack of belief 
in the power of one’s own voice in politics, and there is no significant interest in politics 
and some of them express belief that they do not understand politics well.  
Related to the questions of care, one can find it puzzling that the care for elderly is 
not significantly correlated with the attitudes of the degrowth ideology. However, because 
in the entire sample this opinion is very highly supported (over 80% of respondents agrees 
and completely agrees), in that sense those who are scoring highly on the degrowth related 
attitudes do not differ significantly from those who do not. The same is with an opinion 
related to the care of the one’s family coming before care for the other members of society, 
which is supported (scoring 4 or 5) by 90% of the respondents in the sample. Therefore, 
there is not enough of the variability in the population for this to be significant in the case 
of the degrowth supporters. But we can still discern that those supporting the degrowth 
are in more supporting the concept of solidarity because they significantly more hold that 
one should help his/hers friends if one is financially better off. The support of solidarity, 
as an attitude related to degrowth also one should explore further with questions more 
sensitive to different types of thinking within the (Croatian) population. 
Looking back at the degrowth concept, and its central points of reference related to 
cultural change (D’Alisa et al. 2014; Kallis 2018), in Croatian society we find some poten-
tiality for the degrowth society. As Kallis had noted in his book on the degrowth (2018), 
referring to Latouche (2009) and D’Alisa et al. (2014) “those who use the term (degrowth) 
signify something bigger, a vision or imaginary of an alternative world” (Kallis et al. 2018: 
117). In his (utopian) thinking, possible degrowth future “…decentres the economic and 
re-embeds it within the social and the political. Human activity and work in degrowth 
imaginary are centred around the care for other humans… economc is not the end in 
itself, but a means to superior end: the satisfaction of our biological needs and our quest 
for meaning” (Kallis et al. 2018: 118). Author’s principles of the degrowth utopia include: 
ending of the exploitation, direct democracy, localised production, sharing of the commons, 
strong relationships, slowing of the expense of natural material, principle of care, diversify-
ing of the economy, and decommodification of the land and value. We go a bit further by 
saying that such society needs values that support these processes. In our research on the 
Croatian sample we have found values that support ending of exploitation, importance 
of commons, valuing of nature, and valuing principles of care and of relationships. It is 
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however obvious that the concept of the degrowth is much more complex and that we 
will need further research to describe this value systems (attitudes) that support it more 
thoroughly. For example, related to the principle of care, today most of the care-work falls 
disproportionately on women, especially poor women who take care of their own and other 
people’s households. We find in our research some of values supporting principles of care, 
but have not researched the most important dimension of it, and that is the one related to 
gender roles and inequality. Also as D’Alisa et al. (2014) propose that care should move to 
the public sphere, be shared collectively where possible, e.g. the childcare sharing groups, or 
co-housing projects with provision for elders. Unpaid care work would be valued in a way 
that this hierarchy of value of labour would be inverted. Care should also extend beyond 
the reproduction of human species, it should be concentrated also on caring for other 
living beings and species. Values that support such type of society are from the domain 
of private – public lives and wellbeing, together with the lifestyle choices, which we were 
not collecting in our modules. Therefore, we intend to explore further through different 
statistical procedures and possibilities to which possible values from other domains of 
culture the degrowth construct corresponds, or belongs to.  
So, as explained there are limitations to this research, mainly related to the fact that all 
of the researched opinions should be further expanded to form attitudes in Eysneck’s (1954) 
sense, and in order to better clarify and support dimensions of the degrowth ideology such 
as are in the domains of care, democracy and political preferences and opinions. However, 
our instruments, analyses and research, and furthermore our approach to the topic of the 
degrowth ideology, can be useful in future research that aims to establish scheme of valuable 
attitudes that should be developed, and where developed supported (through education, 
advocacy and political action) for any society to have a chance for cultural transformation 
towards the degrowth society.
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VREDNOTE, KI SO LAHKO PODLAGA TRANSFORMACIJAM DRUŽBENO-
POLITIČNEGA SISTEMA
Avtorji obravnavajo odnose, vrednote in ideologije, ki lahko potencialno vplivajo na kulturne 
spremembe k bolj okoljsko in socialno trajnostnemu družbeno-političnemu sistemu. Glavni 
okvir razprave je paradigma odrasti, rezultati analiz na »hrvaškem« primeru pa temeljijo na 
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dveh modulih mednarodnega programa socialnega raziskovanja v letu 2017. Glavni kazalnik 
(kulturnih) potencialov novega razvoja je »lestvica odrasti«, sestavljena iz treh razsežnosti, 
povezanih s (1) prepoznavanjem potrebe po koncu gospodarske rasti, (2) prepoznavanjem 
potrebe družbe, da se zgodi socialna sprememba, in (3) s priznanjem, da naj bo družba manj 
materialistično usmerjena. Te razsežnosti so v razpravi statistično kontekstualizirane glede na 
socialno-demografske značilnosti anketirancev, njihove vrednote in odnos do ekonomije, socialne 
pravičnosti in neenakosti, do vloge vlade, demokracije in skrbi za okolje. Rezultati so pokazali, 
da na Hrvaškem starejše generacije bolj podpirajo stališča ideologije odrasti; hkrati pa je mogoče 
zaznati, da je potencial za razvoj odnosa do odrasti prisoten v celotni populaciji. Ugotovitve 
podpirajo teoretično predstavo, da ideologija odrasti zahteva na eni strani prerazporeditev 
gospodarstva, na drugi pa izraža potrebo po spodobnem življenju za vse člane družbe. V tem 
okviru so pomembni dejavniki skrb za prijatelje, za okolje in nematerialni vidiki vsakdanjega 
življenja, npr. umetnost in kultura. Glede teh vprašanj ni niti na levem niti desnem političnem 
spektru bistvenih razlik; vsekakor pa se vsaj na Hrvaškem zdi, da so za ta vprašanja nekoliko 
občutljivejše leve stranke, a to bo treba posebej raziskati. Predstavljeni instrumenti, analize in 
raziskave ideologije odrasti so lahko uporabni v prihodnjih raziskavah; cilj je oblikovati shemo 
stališč, ki bi jih bilo treba razviti in npr. z izobraževanjem, zagovorništvom in političnimi 
ukrepi podpirati v vsaki družbo, ki si prizadeva za kulturno preobrazbo v družbo odrasti.
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